State of Utah v. Dionicio Blanco Jr : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
State of Utah v. Dionicio Blanco Jr : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall W. Richards; Public Defender Association, Inc.; Counsel for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Counsel for Appellee .
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Blanco, No. 20050251 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5677
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintifl7Appellee, 
vs. Case No. 20050251-CA 
DIONICIO BLANCO JR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS APPEAL IS FROM A FINDING OF GUILTY OF ASSAULT BY A 
PRISONER, A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY. THE DEFENDANT WAS FOUND 
GUILTY BY A JURY ON JANUARY 13, 2005 AND WAS SENTENCED ON 
FEBRUARY 23, 2005. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR TfflS 
APPEAL UNDER U.C.A. §78-2A-3(E). 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503) 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, INC. OF WEBER 
COUNTY 
2550 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 1 2 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. Case No. 20050251-CA 
DIONICIO BLANCO JR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS APPEAL IS FROM A FINDING OF GUILTY OF ASSAULT BY A 
PRISONER, A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY. THE DEFENDANT WAS FOUND 
GUILTY BY A JURY ON JANUARY 13, 2005 AND WAS SENTENCED ON 
FEBRUARY 23, 2005. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS 
APPEAL UNDER U.C.A. §78-2A-3(E). 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503) 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, INC. OF WEBER 
COUNTY 
2550 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENTOF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO 
INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS 7 
CONCLUSION 14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 15 
ADDENDA: 
Addendum A: Transcript pages Rl 09/140 through 144 
Addendum B: Sentence, Judgment and Commitment 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH STATE CASES 
State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) 11 
State .vBruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) 13,14 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 - 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 10, 13, 14 
State v. Cravens, 15 P.3d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 12 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) 10 
State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) 9, 10 
State v. Mitchell, 119 V2<\ 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) 14 
State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6 P.3d 1120 (Utah 2000) 2 
State v. Shickles, 160 P.2d 291. 295-296 (Utah 1988) 11 
State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001) 2, 11 
STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-5-102.5 2,3 
§78-2a-3(e) 1,2 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 
Rule 404(b) 2,4,9, 10 
Rule 608(b) 3 
Rule 609(a)(1) 3 
Rule 609(a)(2)- 3, 12 
l 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : Case No. 20050251-CA 
DIONICIO BLANCO JR, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Assault by a Prisoner, a Third-
degree felony. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury on January 13, 2005, 
and was sentenced on February 23, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE 
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was properly preserved by timely 
objections by defense counsel (R. 109 / 140-144). This issue should be 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. "When reviewing a 
trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), we apply an abuse 
of discretion standard." State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). In 
addition, this court should "review the record to determine whether the 
admission of [prior] bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial 
judge 4in the proper exercise of that discretion.'" State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6 
P.3d 1120 (Utah 2000)(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
U.C.A. § 76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or 
waste of time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
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purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Rule 608(b)- Evidence of character and conduct of witness -Specific instances 
of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime 
as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) 
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness 
as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
Rule 609(a)(1) &(2)- Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime-
evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime 
shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
Evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with assault by a prisoner in 
violation of UCA §76-5-102.5. (R. 004-007). The Defendant was convicted at 
jury trial. (R. 109). The Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
0-5 years at the Utah State Prison. 
During the trial, held on January 13, 2005, the State asked questions 
concerning some shoes that the defendant had in his possession that were 
termed illegal, as they violated jail policy. Defense counsel strenuously 
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objected to this evidence as violative of Rule 403 and 404 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The trial court, without making any specific findings regarding the 
probative value and prejudicial effect, overruled defendant's objection. 
The defendant was found guilty by the jury on January 13, 2005, and 
sentenced on February 23, 2005. The Judgment, sentence and commitment was 
entered on February 23, 2005 and the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal 
on March 10, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 13, 2004 the defendant and the victim were both inmates in 
the Weber County jail. The victim, Levi Hopper, was serving time on a felony 
drug charge and was assigned to Delta Pod section 4. (R. 109 / 67). At this 
time the defendant was also assigned to Delta-4 and was functioning in the 
position of a trustee, or someone who had extra privileges and duties in the pod 
in which they stayed (R. 109 / 69). 
Mr. Hopper testified that he had borrowed some commissary items from 
the defendant and on the morning of February 13 th the defendant had requested 
those items back from the victim (R. 109 / 72). The victim claimed that the 
defendant seemed upset and kept asking for the commissary items to be 
returned (R. 109 / 74). The victim turned to talk to another individual when he 
was suddenly struck by someone who he thought was the defendant (R. 109 / 
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75). The victim testified that there were other people around at the time and he 
did not fully see the punch (R. 109 / 99). After being struck the victim fell to 
the ground and the defendant approached the victim and told him to get up. 
Upon the victim's refusal to rise the defendant began kicking him and stomped 
on his chest (R. 109 / 76). Mr. Hopper claimed that the defendant hit him in the 
left eye with his left hand and caused it to bleed (R. 109 / 78). 
After the incident, the victim stayed in his cell until Officer Lemmon 
approached him on a routine walk through and asked the victim what had 
caused his eye to bleed (R. 109 / 86). Mr. Hopper told the officer that he had 
been doing pushups and a drawer had fallen on him, cutting his eye. He asked 
to be able to go to medical for treatment (R. 109 / 86-88). The victim claimed 
he lied to Officer Lemmon because he didn't want to be labeled as a tattletale 
in the jail (R. 109 / 87). After getting to the medical area the victim told him 
that he had been hit by a guy known as "Junebug" who was the house mouse 
(trustee) (R. 109 / 89). Mr. Hopper testified that he believed that Junebug's last 
name was Blanco (R. 109 / 89). 
Officer Lemmon testified that after the victim had told him that Junebug 
was the one who assaulted him, he went to Delta pod and inspected the 
knuckles of each inmate on that pod and found that the defendant's left hand 
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was slightly swollen (R. 109 / 137). He also testified that no other inmate had 
swollen knuckles. 
Over the strenuous objection of defense counsel the trial court allowed 
the officer to testify that several days after the incident he discovered and 
confiscated a pair of illegal shoes from the defendant (R. 109 / 140-143). 
Although the State claimed that knowing if the defendant was wearing illegal 
shoes at the time of the incident would substantiate the injuries received(R. 109 
/ 143), they put on no evidence to that effect, and in fact, the victim testified 
that he did not recall what type of shoes the defendant was wearing at the time 
(R.109/79). 
Five days later, on February 18, 2004, the victim was released from the 
jail and went to the hospital where he was diagnosed with two fractures around 
his left eye and some residual nerve damage (R. 109 / 96, 97). Dr. Anderson 
testified that he examined the victim and found fractures around his left eye 
and treated Mr. Hopper by putting in three plates in the face around the eye (R. 
109/113). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. There 
was a specific instance where the trial court abused its discretion by allowing 
the State to introduce prejudicial evidence against the Defendant. 
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This error occurred during the trial when the trial court allowed the State 
to introduce evidence of the Defendant's possession in the jail of some 
"illegal" (in violation of jail rules) shoes. Defense counsel timely objected to 
this evidence yet the Court failed to conduct a Rule 403 analysis to determine 
whether the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value. 
The nature of this allegation was harmful to the defendant since the only 
evidence regarding the commission of this offense was from another inmate 
who testified that the assault occurred. The entire trial hinged on the credibility 
of this witness, who had given two contradictory stories, and even the slightest 
shift in believability of one over the other clearly affected the outcome of the 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACT. 
The trial of the defendant was held on January 13, 2005, and the jury 
heard the testimony of three witnesses. In reality, however, the evidence 
against the defendant consisted of one witness, the victim who claimed that the 
defendant was the one who hit him and caused significant injuries. Dr. Douglas 
Anderson, the treating physician several days after the incident testified as to 
the injuries the victim received but could do nothing to affirm or dispute the 
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identity of the assailant. Correctional Officer Robert Lemmon testified that he 
observed the victim's injuries (a fact not in dispute at trial) and testified that the 
victim originally told him that he had hurt himself doing pushups (R. 109 / 86-
88) Officer Lemmon further testified later the victim told him that the 
defendant had hit him, which resulted in the officer examining the knuckles of 
the inmates in the pod, looking specifically for the knuckles of the defendant, 
and finding slight swelling on the defendant's left hand. (R. 109 /137) 
Most damaging, however, was the testimony of Officer Lemmon 
regarding the subsequent bad acts of the defendant over the objection of trial 
counsel. He testified that the defendant had in his possession, several days 
after the incident, some shoes that were in violation of jail policy. The 
defendant objected to "anything happening a few day afterwards" and the 
prosecutor told the court, "Judge, I think it goes to the same, the same issue." 
Without further analysis, the court overruled the objection (R. 109 / 140,141). 
Defense counsel then attempted to renew the objection by requesting a 
voir dire of the witness (R. 109 / 142). Upon examination, the witness could 
not testify that the shoes were in the defendant's possession at the time of the 
incident (R. 109 / 142). Defense counsel again moved to strike the testimony 
on relevancy grounds, which objection was again overruled (R. 109 /143). The 
defendant tried once again to object claiming the evidence was "simply an 
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attempt to prejudice the jury by saying he had some illegal shoes a couple of 
days later (R. 109 /143), which the trial court again overruled (R. 109 / 144). 
During this entire exchange the trial court made no rule 403 analysis, did 
not consider the prejudicial effect to the defendant, and made no finding of the 
probative value this evidence may have provided. 
The State argued that this evidence would be relevant "based on the 
injuries that Mr. Hopper [the victim] had and the fact that he was stomped on 
the chest." (R. 109 / 143). The state never put on any evidence that would 
establish that these injuries were more severe or more identifiable due to the 
unauthorized shoes. 
In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that, "this Court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes may 
not be admitted to prove that the defendant has a bad character or a disposition 
to commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states, 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets 
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002). 
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In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy 
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably 
necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
at 1075. 
In State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that for prior bad acts to be admissible at trial, there had to be "a 
special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other 
than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality." Id. at 426. 
In State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the defendant was 
charged with rape from an incident that occurred in 1987. After the defendant 
was charged for the 1987 offense, two women came forward and accused the 
Defendant of raping them in 1985. The trial court allowed both women to 
testify at the defendant's trial for the 1987 incident. 
This Court found reversible error in allowing the two women to testify. 
"We cannot conclude that the actions of defendant constitute a common design 
or modus operandi. The similarities are common to many assault or rape cases 
and are not peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct. Defendant's acts 
were not so unique as to constitute a signature." Id. at 6. This Court also 
found that the prior bad acts were too remote in time. "The two prior acts 
occurred nearly two years before defendant was charged with a third, unrelated 
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sexual assault. There is no apparent connection between defendant's earlier 
conduct and his intent in relation to the 1987 rape charge.'5 Id. 
In State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), this Court set 
forth six factors that should be utilized when using the balancing test of Rule 
403. 
When conducting a Rule 403 review of prior bad acts evidence, 
trial courts should consider several factors, including: (1) " fthe 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other [bad 
acts]/ " (2) " fthe similarities between the [charged offense and the 
prior bad acts],1 " (3) " fthe interval of time that has elapsed 
between the [charged offense and the prior bad acts],' " (4) " 'the 
need for the evidence,1 " (5) " fthe efficacy of alternative proof,' " 
and (6) " 'the degree to which the evidence will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility.' " (citing State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 
(Utah 2001)(quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 29L 295-96 (Utah 
1988}). 
In applying this analysis to the case at bar there, is simply no probative 
value of the evidence admitted. (1) Although the strength of the evidence of the 
subsequent bad act is not suspect, there was simply no evidence as to whether 
the defendant had the shoes at the time of the incident and therefore this prong 
was not met. (2) Although the prosecutor claimed she would establish 
relevance to the charged offense, there was never any evidence produced to 
show the probative value of the illegal shoes. (3) Several days had lapsed 
between the assault and the officer finding the shoes in the defendant's 
possession, which would at best show some diminutive probative value if there 
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had been any evidence that the injuries could be somehow tied to the shoes 
(such as blood splatters, etc.). (4) The was no articulable reason for the 
introduction of this evidence to prove any of the elements of the offense 
charged. (5) The State could conceivably claim the need of this evidence to 
bolster a failing case. (6) Finally, the degree to which the evidence would 
arouse the hostility of the jury is obvious based upon the claim that the 
defendant had illegal contraband in the jail, was violating jail policy, and the 
fact that the prosecution chose to introduce this totally irrelevant evidence in 
the first place. 
In the case of State v. Cravens, 15 P.3d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) this 
Court ruled that the admission of a defendant's prior burglary record in a trial 
on a charge of threatening with a dangerous weapon constituted error. The 
Court stated: 
Accordingly, the nature of defendant's prior conviction for 
burglary neither has any bearing on defendant's veracity as a 
witness, nor is such a conviction admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). 
In fact, we are unable to discern any probative value that 
defendant's burglary conviction might have on the present matter. 
(Id. At 638) 
A final factor to be considered is the fact that the defendant never 
testified at trial. Any possible attempt to impact the veracity of the defendant's 
testimony would therefore be irrelevant, since the defendant did not take the 
stand. 
12 
A. ANY PROBATIVE VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond proving mere 
criminal disposition, it is still subject to the protections of Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 5. The factors a court should 
consider when weighing the probative value of prior conviction evidence 
against its prejudicial effect are "the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, 
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably 
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id. 
The trial Court did not do a Rule 403 analysis. It simply overruled the 
defendant's several objections without any finding of probative value. Even 
when defense counsel claimed the evidence was "irrelevant" and "prejudicial", 
the court simply overruled the objection. Since the trial court failed to engage 
in a Rule 403 analysis, this Court should reverse Defendant's conviction. 
B. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ADMIT THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained must "be 
sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant in its absence." State .v Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 
13 
(Utah 1989). In State v. Cox. This Court said that "[although the State 
presented evidence on which might be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction, 
we are nevertheless persuaded that the jury may have reached a different result 
in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence of the prior sexual assaults." 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 7. 
Informing the jury that the Defendant had illegal contraband in his 
possession several days after the incident had no other purpose than to 
prejudice the jury against the defendant. If the "taint" caused by inadmissible 
evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence 
to support a verdict." State v. Mitchell 119 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). 
Because the prior bad act evidence is so highly prejudicial, the Defendant's 
convictions should be reversed and the Defendant should receive a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the errors that occurred during Defendant's trial, his right to 
a fair trial was denied. It is very likely that the Defendant would have received 
a more favorable result if the jury were unaware of his subsequent possession 
of illegal contraband in the jail. Based on this irrelevant and prejudicial 
evidence, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
conviction and grant him a new trial. 
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DATED this 2. daY of August 2005. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
16 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
addi-
Q 
A 
Q 
tion 
personal 
conf 
this 
don' 
that 
A 
Q 
Okay. 
After that 
In addition 
to that, you 
-
to that, let's stop you there, in 
L said that you inventoried Mr. Blanco's 
items; is that right? 
Yes, ma'am. 
Were there 
iscated from him 
-
MR. GRAVIS: 
t even know where 
Q 
was 
A 
MS. NEIDER: 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
anything, were there any items that were 
at that point that might be relevant to 
Your Honor, we're going to object. I 
\ she's going with it. [inaudible] 
I'll tell you that it is. 
[inaudible]. 
[inaudible]. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
THE COURT: Objection's overruled. 
(BY MS. NEIDER) Officer Lemmon, is there something 
confiscated or taken out of his property? 
I have no recollection at that particular day of 
taking any specific item from his property. I'm sure there 
were several things taken. He was moved to a higher security 
level area and there's several things that are restricted to 
him at that point. 
There was an instant, an instance a few days 
after this incident -
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MR. GRAVIS: I'm going to object to anything 
happening a few days afterwards, [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Unless it's relevant to this. 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, I think it goes to the same, the 
same issue. 
THE COURT: Okay, all right, overruled. 
Go ahead. 
MS. NEIDER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: There was an issue where Mr. Blanco had 
some shoes that he was not authorized to have and as part of 
another move he was taken out of his cell, moved to yet another 
cell and those shoes were taken. 
Q (BY MS. NEIDER) Okay, typically what do the inmates 
wear in the jail for shoes? 
A Typically they have some, they're just called shower 
shoes. 
Q Okay. 
A They're a soft rubber, more or less a sandal. Now on 
certain occasions inmates can have tennis shoes. But the 
jail's very picky about what shoes they will allow and will not 
allow inmates to have. 
Q Okay, and the shoes that were taken from him wouldn't 
have been the standard shower shoes; is that right? 
A No ma'am, they were not -
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Q Okay. 
A - the standard jail issue shoes. 
Q Okay, and those were taken from his property a couple 
of days after this incident happened with Mr. Hopper; is that 
right? 
A Yes, ma'am, they were. 
Q Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness? 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q Did you take the shoes? 
A I was a party to the taking of the shoes. 
Q Okay. 
A There were several officers involved. 
Q Okay, you were a party then. Did you recall seeing 
those shoes when you moved him out of D pod? 
A He was never moved out of D pod. He was moved to 
another area inside D pod. 
Q Well, did you see those shoes when you moved him the 
first time? 
A When I, when we moved him the first time? 
Q Yeah. 
A Not to my recollection. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I would move to strike the 
whole thing. Unless they can say he had those shoes at that 
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time. It's irrelevant anyway, but unless they can say he had 
the shoes at the time the alleged incident occurred, it's 
completely irrelevant. It has no, has no bearing whatsoever. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, I think it is relevant. Based on 
the injuries that Mr. Hopper had and the fact that he was 
stomped on the chest. If Mr. Gravis wants to argue to the 
jury-
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, the State has -
MS. NEIDER: - the way they should -
MR. GRAVIS: - no evidence -
MS. NEIDER: - can I make my statement? 
THE COURT: Let her finish the -
MS. NEIDER: If Mr. Gravis wants to argue to the jury 
the weight that that should be taken, that's fine. But I think 
that it is relevant and it should be admitted to the jury. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, there's absolutely -
THE COURT: Over, overruled. 
MR. GRAVIS: - no evidence that the in, that the 
injuries were caused by any kind of particular shoes. This is 
simply an attempt to prejudice the jury by saying he had some 
illegal shoes a couple days later. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. GRAVIS: When they can't even prove he had the 
shoes the day of this alleged incident occurred. 
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1 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection, go ahead. 
2 MS. NEIDER: Thank you, Your Honor. Judge, I don't 
3 have any other questions for Officer Lemmon. 
4 THE COURT: Cross? 
5 CROSS EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. GRAVIS: 
7 Q How long you been a corrections officer here in Weber 
8 County? 
9 A Just over two years. 
10 Q Just over two years. Do you know how old the jail is 
11 over there on 12th Street? 
12 A I believe we're pushing either four or five years. 
13 Q Four or five years, so it's a pretty new jail, pretty 
14 state of the art, correct? 
15 A It is quite new. 
16 Q And the pods and the sections of the pods they have a 
17 common area, day room, is on the same level as the control room 
18 outside of the cell, outside the pod, right? 
19 A It is outside of the pod. I wouldn't say exactly the 
20 same level, but pretty darn close. 
21 Q And it's glass, right? Or clear material? 
22 A Yes, sir. 
23 Q Very easy to see through? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
25 Q Okay, and then the upper cells are, but then the cells 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIONICIO JR BLANCO, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041901320 FS 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Date: February 23, 2 005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vennaw 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GRAVIS, MARTIN V 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 8, 1971 
Video 
Tape Number: J0223 05 Tape Count: 2:25 
CHARGES 
1. ASSAULT BY PRISONER 
Plea: Not Guilty 
HEARING 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: 01/13/2005 Guilty 
This is the time set for sentencing. Camille Neider is present 
representing the State of Utah. Martin Gravis is present 
representing the defendant. Attorney Gravis addresses the Court 
The defendant addresses the Court. Ms. Neider submits. 
The Court proceeds with sentencing. 
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Case No: 041901320 
Date: Feb 23, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ASSAULT BY PRISONER a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence in this case may run concurrently with the sentence 
the defendant is currently serving. The defendant is authorized 
credit for all time previously served in this case. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $14,368.23, to 
be remitted as follows: $840.00 to Levi Hopper, and $13,528.23 to 
the Weber County Correctional Facility which paid Mr. Hopper's 
medical bills. 
Dated this ^ day of / ^ W •f 20 <* jT". 
ERNIE W JONES 
District Court Judge 
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